Our church has a Senior Seminar that we do each year. The goal is to prepare graduating high school seniors for the next phase in life and to grapple with living out their faith in a complex world. I am teaching the section on philosophy and logic.
It is always fun to come up with examples that can illustrate various forms of a logical argument. I call this one Philosophy’s Revenge. Continue reading
I recently found a great new blog – Every Thought Captive, authored by Professor Rich Davis and Professor Paul Franks of the Tyndale Philosophy Department.
Here is a mash-up of three great posts they recently published that deal with truth and beliefs. I recommend you hit their blog (links are provided), read them in their entirety, and then start following their blog.
People almost invariably arrive at their beliefs not on the basis of proof but on the basis of what they find attractive – Blaise Pascal
Peter Enns, noted for his rejection of a literal Adam, recently wrote a provocative post stating that he doesn’t believe in God but he trusts Him. For Enns belief is equated with “ideas about God”, “articles of faith”, or “an intellectual construction” that is “in our heads”, while trust is “doing it, risking it” and “is much harder”. If Enns is saying saving faith is much more than head knowledge and getting some facts right about God than I agree.
But Enns seems to be saying more than this. Prof Franks tackles the problem made by Enns implicit assertion – that one can trust God without worrying about what one believes about Him:
First, to “trust God” you must at least “believe that God exists.” If you say to someone, “I trust God at this particular moment” and he responds by saying, “Why are you bothering with trusting in something that doesn’t even exist?” how could you respond without advancing your beliefs about God? It’s not clear that you can. … That is, you’re going to have to respond by not only noting that you believe God exists, but also that you believe certain things about God—namely that he is trustworthy.
Rob Bell, author of Love Wins and a new book exploring God, also seems to expressing the same idea as Enns in a recent HarperOne broadcast. Prof Davis quotes the relevant portion of the broadcast and then captures the problem with Bell’s “a good view of God is one that makes me a better person”:
The strange thing about Bell’s process for dispelling doubt is that it doesn’t appear to be truth-oriented at all. There is no attempt, so far as I can tell, to acquire or assess any reasons for belief. His method for theological belief revision, by his own account, is entirely subjective, pragmatic, and non-truth-conducive …
The “measure of a good view of God” isn’t that there are reasons for thinking there is a God corresponding to that concept. It’s whether it works for you. … In the end, it seems very likely that Bell is operating with a dogma of his own: we should adopt those understandings of God we find most empowering to us personally.
Everyone did what was right in his own eyes – Judges
To say that a proposition is objectively true is only to say that its truth obtains apart from what any of us thinks, feels, or believes; it obtains by virtue of the way the world is. …
You can’t rightly believe in (i.e., trust, put your faith in) someone unless you believe that they exist. You have to believe certain objective truths about Jesus; otherwise you can’t be his disciple. … Indeed, it isn’t rational to give your life to someone who either isn’t really there (i.e., lacks objective existence) or is the product of your imagination (i.e., has subjective existence alone). Belief that (i.e., assent to objective truth) is a precondition for belief in.
The SCOTUS recently heard oral arguments in two cases related to gay marriage. How they will decide these cases is anyone’s guess, but it is certain that their decisions will influence the national debate that has so far resulted in a patchwork of state laws.
What is marriage? Who gets to define it? What is its purpose?
This is a complicated and emotional topic.
I think the Scriptures provide the answers – from the beginning God instituted the concept of marriage as the joining of a man and a woman with the result being the formation of a unit called the family. I think the Scriptures are equally clear that the ideal for marriage is one male married to one female, joined together until death separates them, with sexual encounters being exclusive to this couple.
Even if Christians agreed with the answers given above (and not all do), how should a pluralistic society where opinions and ideas are not coming from a Judeo-Christian perspective deal with these questions? Specifically what is marriage to the government and the society it governs? How does marriage differ from a civil-union? And who has the right to be considered “married” and by whom? Should it be the federal government, state governments, or the church/religious institution? Continue reading
We are exploring different views on free will. In the first post we described a situation where a running back in the NFL has entered free agency. The player has 3 different offers. In this example we have avoided complicating the illustration by avoiding choices where a person is exercising saving faith or committing a sin. We already took a look at how a compatibilist might view this choice. Now we tackle the same scenario from a libertarian free will perspective.
Sam Harris, an atheist and determinist, calls the concept of free will an illusion. In his book Free Will he defines the type of free will that he argues does not exist:
The popular conception of free will seems to rest on two assumptions: (1) that each of us could have behaved differently that we did in the past, and (2) that we are the conscious source of most of our thoughts and actions in the present.
This is a reasonable definition of Libertarian Free Will (LFW). I would only make the second assumption more explicit than what is implied here. That in the present we have the actual ability to choose differently.
The choice according to Libertarian Free Will (unrestricted free agent):
Our running back has been presented with 3 different contract offers from Team A, B, and C. The player has chosen to sign with Team C. This is the team that offered him the most money and the opportunity to be the starting running back.
Under the LFW view this player is an unrestricted free agent. He freely chose to sign with Team C and bears full responsibility for that decision. This decision came after deliberation and wrestling with conflicted desires. This choice was “open” because the player could have chosen any of the three teams. Contrary to determinism and compatibilism there would not need to be any any changes in past events for a different choice. The player’s ability to freely choose does not mean that God is not sovereign or that He was caught by surprise when the choice was made. God, being omniscient, knew ahead of time (foreknew) what the outcome was going to be.
If foreknowledge makes the outcome certain, isn’t that the same as being determined?
Compatibilists understand that there is a tension between human responsibility and God determining events. How can God have a predetermined plan that accords with His will and still allow people to make choices according to their will. Michael Horton argues that those holding to LFW have the same problem as Calvinists when it comes to dealing with this tension. Why? Because God having foreknowledge makes the outcome just as certain as if it was determined.
Classic Arminian theology shares with Calvinism—indeed with all historic branches of Christianity—that God’s foreknowledge comprehends all future events. There is nothing that happens, nothing that you and I do, that lies outside of God’s eternal foreknowledge.
… everyone who affirms God’s exhaustive foreknowledge has exactly the same problem as any Calvinist. If God knows that Adam will sin—or that you and I will sin—and could keep it from happening, but does not, and God’s knowledge is infallible, then it is just as certain as if he had predestined it. In fact, it is the same as being predestined.
However, I think Horton is wrong in assuming that foreknowledge is the same as determinism (being predestined). Knowing something will happen with certainty is not the same as ordaining that it must come to pass.The fans of Team A may be upset that the player signed with another team. They might even struggle with why God allowed it to occur. But God cannot be logically held responsible for that choice even if He knew about it in advance and let it happen. In His sovereignty He allowed the player the freedom to make his own choice.
However, if God is ‘ultimately, decisively in control of all decisions’ then it would seem logical to assign some responsibility to Him. Horton says only a hyper-Calvinist will see God’s decrees as being the cause of any determined event. But if God does not bring the event to pass how is it theologically determined? If God’s decree ordaining the event is not the ultimate cause then the question becomes who (or what) was? If one answers this question: ‘the desire of the player’; then we must ask what caused this desire in the player? Most Calvinists would list a host of factors that caused the desire, but in a deterministic system it would logically follow that God was the ultimate cause of these factors and therefore the desire as well.
The player was limited by genetics and the offers that were presented so he was not free to choose anyway?
C.Michael Patton tries to explain how a Calvinist understands LFW. Writing against LFW, Patton explains that there are numerous factors in your life that factor into determining who you are that you do not get to choose. These include when and where you were born, your genetics, etc.
Not only are you who you are because of your identification with a fallen human race, but notice all these factors that you did not choose that go into the set up for any given “free will” decision made. … All of these factors play an influencing role in who you are at the time of any given decision.
He is correct, these factors all play a role in the decision that is made and the desires of the person making the decision. Had our player not been born with the genetics and athletic abilities needed to be a football player he would never have the opportunity to play in the NFL let alone choose the next contract he would sign. However, that does not mean that the player does not have LFW. It just means that factors like genetic makeup and where/when a person lives will be factors that shape the person and limit the options they have available to choose from.
I don’t think Patton is making the case here that limited options are a reason to reject the LFW view. But it is important to understand that LFW is not the ability to choose anything. It is the ability to choose from a set of possible options. Athletic ability, hard work in practice, coaching philosophies, draft positions, injuries to players, and cap room are some of the numerous factors that came into play when teams evaluate whether to make an offer to a player. However, while these affect what options are possible, they do not mean that the player did not have a LFW ability to choose from among those that were available.
If the player has LFW then his choice is random?
In the same post C.Michael Patton says that a if a person has LFW then he is not making the choice because the will must be neutralized to have the freedom to choose against one’s will. This would make the choice a random act.
In a truly libertarian sense, this decision cannot have influences of any kind. Any decision without influences is arbitrary. It would be like flipping a coin. I chose A rather than B, not because of who I am, but for no reason at all. It just turned out that way.
Over at Ligonier Ministries they arrive at the same conclusion regarding LFW.
This understanding of human freedom says that we have the ability to make spontaneous choices contrary to our dispositions and inclinations. Nothing determines our choices. We are always able to choose good or evil. Our wills are wholly neutral.
… if our wills are neutral, why do we make decisions at all? For example, consider what would happen if I were presented with an apple and an orange and must decide which one to eat. If I am neutral I will have no preference for either fruit and no reason to choose one or the other. Nothing will move me to pick one, and I will starve to death.
If I understand the Calvinist reasoning here, they are arguing that a person makes a choice according to their will and it is always done according to their strongest desire. In order to choose something other than what they desire the most, the person would have to have their desires neutralized. But once that happens the person’s will is no longer involved in the choice.
However, only an a priori assumption that we must choose according to our strongest desire requires this kind of reasoning. LFW rejects determinism and therefore can logically conclude that our will and desires, while being shaped and influenced, are not determined solely by past events or genetics. Our will is a part of us that allows us to make conscious decisions at a point in time choosing freely from among competing desires.
J. C. Thibodaux, an Arminian, writes in a post exploring this in more detail:
The Calvinist case here essentially states,
We can’t choose otherwise since we can’t intend otherwise.
… Such a statement only makes sense if one already assumes that people have no control over their intents/reasons for how they act.
He goes on to conclude that there is no logical reason to assume that we can’t intend otherwise. The only reason to assume we can’t is because Calvinists have defined free will in a way that excludes that possibility.
This is the third in a series of posts that explain how I understand the debate over free will and where I currently “land the plane”. Having started the series with the band Rush’s lyrics to Free Will I will end with them as well:
I will choose a path that’s clear
I will choose freewill.
How do you choose between these options? And if you choose not to decide, you still have made a choice.
We are exploring different views on free will. In the first post we described a situation where a running back in the NFL has entered free agency. He has been presented with 3 different offers. In this example we have avoided complicating the illustration by avoiding choices where a person is exercising saving faith or committing a sin.
Both theists and non-theists wrestle with the concept of determinism. The non-theist determinist ascribes the ultimate cause – the prime mover – to the universe and the physical laws of nature.The latest album Clockwork Angels by the band Rush explores the topic in the song BU2B:
the universe has a plan
we are only human
it’s not ours to understand
Theologians would not agree with the idea that the “universe” has a plan or that we are just “dancing to the music of our DNA” as Richard Dawkins asserts. However, many accept theological determinism where God has determined or ordained all events. In either case, for the determinist, the choices made are fixed to a single outcome. As we explore Compatibilism we will be tackling it from the theist’s point of view, specifically the Reformed/Calvinist perspective.
The choice according to Compatibilism (restricted free agent):
Our running back has been presented with 3 different contract offers from Team A, B, and C. The player has chosen to sign with Team C. This is the team that offered him the most money and the opportunity to be the starting running back.
Under the Reformed view this choice was made voluntarily by the player according to his desires. But, the choice to sign with Team C was “closed” because it was determined by God’s divine decree. It is in this sense that our player is actually a restricted free agent. The player could not have chosen to sign with Team A or B. These options may have appeared to be possible choices but there was only one certain (foreknown ahead of time by God) and necessary (determined ahead of time by God) outcome. The player would sign with Team C.
John Hendryx (creator and editor over at monergism.com) summarizes this view:
Compatibilism is a form of determinism and it should be noted that this position is no less deterministic than hard determinism. It simply means that God’s predetermination and meticulous providence is “compatible” with voluntary choice. Our choices are not coerced …i.e. we do not choose against what we want or desire, yet we never make choices contrary to God’s sovereign decree. What God determines will always come to pass …
How can the player be responsible for his choice if it was determined by God?
Despite the signing with Team C being determined by God, the player is still considered responsible for his choice because it was voluntarily made based on the player’s nature and desires.
As we described in the first post, the player had multiple competing desires. Each team’s offer sheet appealed to something the player wanted. It is the “strongest” desire that causes the choice. In our example that was the player’s desire to be a starter in the NFL. Even if his “strongest” desire was to play in his home town (Team D), there was no option available to do so, therefore it is the strongest desire that could be acted on that matters.
The strongest desire that the player has is the cause of the choice. However the desire (for most holding this view) itself was caused by all past circumstances and events such that the player could not have a different “strongest” desire and therefore could not choose otherwise.
Where things get interesting is when we explore how God’s sovereignty was exercised over this choice. For it to be a necessary event decreed by God, then He would seemingly have to be involved in some manner for it to actually happen. So for deterministic events does God cause the event to occur? If not, then how was it guaranteed to happen as was decreed? If He does, how does God cause the event to occur? Did God cause the desire or nature that the player has or did He cause the circumstances that caused the desire/nature that the player has?
While those holding this view may differ on the details all admit that God is the ultimate reason for all that occurs. Some Calvinists will go on to admit that there is a tension between the idea of determined acts and the person being responsible for their choice. C Michael Patton over at the Parchment and Pen wrote:
To the Calvinists, man is fully responsible for his choice, yet God’s election is unconditional. Therefore, there is a tension that is created between human responsibility and God’s election. This tension is left in tact since, according to the Calvinist, it is best understood this way in Scripture.
John Piper admits to the tension and difficulty that is found in this view. The quote dealing with this tension starts around the 1 minute 10 second mark in the video.
is it a contradiction or inexplicable how God can be absolutely sovereign over all human decisions and those decisions still be responsible, accountable decisions? I think that is, the one for me anyway, for which I don’t have an ultimate answer …
and again around the 2 minute 10 second mark:
[the] antimony … between human’s being held accountable for their actions … and God being ultimately, decisively in control of all of these decisions those are two truths in the Bible … I don’t solve that problem with free will … I am willing to live with that mystery …
If God determines all things, in what way is He responsible for them taking place?
Where things get even more interesting is when we deal with how God may be responsible for events. God has determined that the player will play for Team C. The player is responsible for his choosing to sign with Team C. But does God, as the sovereign determiner, in any way have some responsibility for the choice?
For Calvinists that depends on whether God caused the choice through “positive agency” being actively involved or whether the choice was caused by God deciding not to act (negative agency). If God withheld some influence so that the player would choose Team C then He is not considered responsible. If God was actively influencing, perhaps through directing the heart (Prov 21:1), then He would have more responsibility as the cause.
Obviously when we are dealing with actions that are sinful, the issues are more important than what team a player signs to play. Attributing God as the cause of sin is of course antithetical to the teaching of Scripture. Calvinists do not (repeat do not) teach that God is the cause of evil or sinful choices. However there is a tension in how God ordains sin without being sinful or responsible for the actor being sinful. Here is how John Piper explains that:
Edwards answers, “If by ‘the author of sin,’ be meant the sinner, the agent, or the actor of sin, or the doer of a wicked thing . . . . it would be a reproach and blasphemy, to suppose God to be the author of sin. In this sense, I utterly deny God to be the author of sin.” But, he argues, willing that sin exist in the world is not the same as sinning. God does not commit sin in willing that there be sin. God has established a world in which sin will indeed necessarily come to pass by God’s permission, but not by his “positive agency.” …
In other words, “sin is not the fruit of any positive agency or influence of the most High, but on the contrary, arises from the withholding of his action and energy, and under certain circumstances, necessarily follows on the want of his influence.”
Many who disagree with Calvinism, see the logical conclusion of God being the determiner and prime mover – whether through positive or negative agency – as making Him the ultimate cause of all choices. What logically follows is that God would be the ultimate cause of evil. Since that can not be the case there needs to be another explanation. The Reformer will leave it to mystery or tension. Others will explore libertarian free will.
[Part 3: Unrestricted Free Agents: Examining Libertarian Free Will]
Do we have “free will” or are we merely “a planet of playthings dancing on strings with nothing left to chance” as Rush describes in the song “Free Will”.
Discussing the concept of “free will” is always a mind bending topic. Especially given the various views on how it works and whether we really have it.
I like the definition Daniel Whedon gave in his work entitled The Freedom of the Will as a Basis of Human Responsibility and a Divine Government (1864). The freedom of the will is the power of the soul by which it is the conscious author of an intentional act.
There are three major views on “free will”, which I have tried to briefly summarize.
A Football player faces Free Agency
In order to illustrate Libertarian free will and Compatibilism I came up with an example that does not focus on how one is saved or involve the commission of a sin/wrong. In this story we examine how a football player entering free agency might choose which team to play for.
A football player playing for a team has reached the end of his contract. He is a running back who has played well. He has been the second back for a team that uses a running back by committee (RBBC) approach. It is the off-season and he has to evaluate where he is going to play next year. His agent calls him up and says he has the following offers.
The player is wrestling with the options he does have before him. He is well liked on his current team and coaches. His family likes the area where they are living and does not want to up root and move. The player sees strong reasons to sign with Team A.
However, the player has always wanted to experience the thrill of playing in the big game and contend for a SuperBowl championship. Despite the pay cut and limited playing time the best way to make this dream come true is to sign with Team B.
Like most players, he would like the chance to prove he can start in the NFL and carry a team. Team C believes he can be a dynamic player in the league and be a key part of the rebuilding process. They have also offered him the most money and in the NFL a player never really knows how long they will be able to play so “cashing in” while healthy is always a strong factor.
Finally, the player grew up in the city where Team D plays. He was really hoping to have the chance to play in his home town during his career. However they have two great players at the running back position and did not make him an offer.
The player has chosen to sign with Team C.
In future posts we will explore whether the player was a restricted free agent (compatibilism) or an unrestricted free agent (libertarian free will).
This post contains the answer to the question posed in the post where the clothes are the person must also be.
I encourage you to try and solve the questions posed in the prior post before reading the answer.
Crime is common. Logic is rare. Therefore it is upon the logic rather than upon the crime that you should dwell. – Holmes
Holmes Statue at Baker Street
Lestrade has established a valid argument. The argument in a more structured form could be stated as follows:
| hypothesis | If the clothes were found by the river then the body must be in the river |
| observation | The clothes were found by the river |
| conclusion | Therefore the body must be in the river |
Lestrade also thought it was a sound (or at least a highly probable argument) based on his actions. He has found the clothes by the river. Based on this evidence (or observation), Lestrade started dragging the Serpentine River looking for a body because of his working assumption that his hypothesis (see table) was true.
However, Holmes frustrates the detective by pointing out (though the argument is valid and the conclusion is probable) there is a faulty assumption Lestrade is making.
Holmes argument could be stated in a more structured form as follows:
| premise | A person is always found near their clothes |
| premise | their clothes (or most of them) are in their closet |
| conclusion | Therefore the person is in the closet |
Lestrade assumes that the clothes being found by the river would be an indicator that the body would also be found nearby. While not committing any formal fallacy, Lestrade is close to committing the fallacy of the converse accident by forming his hypothesis as a general rule that will be true in all circumstances, rather than one of several possibilities. His generalization, even if based on his actual experiences as a detective, will turn out to be incorrect.
If the hypothesis Lestrade accepted was correct, then he would have a more probable chance of success in finding the missing bride by looking in her closet.
This is a good illustration reminding all of us that a valid argument can turn out to be false. While it can be argued that it is probable that the body was in the river, the clothes could also have been placed by the river for a variety of reasons that do not include the body being in the river as the rest of the story shows to be the case.
We balance probabilities and choose the most likely. – Holmes
Sherlock Holmes (Wikipedia)
As pat of the Senior Seminar, we discussed the reality that people don’t write out there arguments in logical form. Part of the brilliance of the Socratic Method was the use of questions to explore and probe a person’s view to expose the underlying assumptions, gaps, and contradictions that may exist. Having looked at the hypothetical form of a philosophical argument, let’s use The Adventure of the Noble Bachelor to practice identifying these arguments within a story.
The official detective was attired in a pea-jacket and cravat, which gave him a decidedly nautical appearance, and he carried a black canvas bag in his hand. With a short greeting he seated himself and lit the cigar which had been offered to him.
“What’s up, then?” asked Holmes with a twinkle in his eye. “You look dissatisfied.”
“And I feel dissatisfied. It is this infernal St. Simon marriage case. I can make neither head nor tail of the business.”
“Really! You surprise me.”
“Who ever heard of such a mixed affair? Every clue seems to slip through my fingers. I have been at work upon it all day.”
“And very wet it seems to have made you,” said Holmes laying his hand upon the arm of the pea-jacket.
“Yes, I have been dragging the Serpentine.”
“In heaven’s name, what for?”
“In search of the body of Lady St. Simon.”
Sherlock Holmes leaned back in his chair and laughed heartily. “Have you dragged the basin of Trafalgar Square fountain?” he asked.
“Why? What do you mean?”
“Because you have just as good a chance of finding this lady in the one as in the other.”
Lestrade shot an angry glance at my companion. “I suppose you know all about it,” he snarled.
“Well, I have only just heard the facts, but my mind is made up.”
“Oh, indeed! Then you think that the Serpentine plays no part in the matter?”
“I think it very unlikely.”
“Then perhaps you will kindly explain how it is that we found this in it?” He opened his bag as he spoke, and tumbled onto the floor a wedding-dress of watered silk, a pair of white satin shoes and a bride’s wreath and veil, all discoloured and soaked in water. “There,” said he, putting a new wedding-ring upon the top of the pile. “There is a little nut for you to crack, Master Holmes.”
“Oh, indeed!” said my friend, blowing blue rings into the air. “You dragged them from the Serpentine?”
“No. They were found floating near the margin by a park-keeper. They have been identified as her clothes, and it seemed to me that if the clothes were there the body would not be far off.”
“By the same brilliant reasoning, every man’s body is to be found in the neighbourhood of his wardrobe.”
Since most people don’t write out there arguments in logical form (which is not saying the argument is illogical), it is good practice to examine a portion of a narrative and write out the argument being made. Can you write the two arguments made in this portion of the story?
Lestrade:
| hypothesis | |
| observation | |
| conclusion |
Holmes points out that there is an unstated assumption Lestrade is making.
Holmes: restating Lestrade’s argument (in categorical form)
| premise | |
| premise | |
| conclusion |
Is Lestrade’s argument valid? Is it sound?
Sherlock Holmes (wikipedia)
Honoring the fact that the Presidential election has gone to the dogs (a sad commentary on political discourse), this post uses dogs to examine the basic hypothetical form of a philosophical argument. To set up the scenario we are going to use the barking dog hypothesis found in the Sherlock Holmes adventure – Silver Blaze.
Colonel Ross still wore an expression which showed the poor opinion which he had formed of my companion’s ability, but I say by the inspector’s face that his attention had been keenly aroused.
“You consider that to be important?” he asked.
“Exceedingly so.”
“Is there any point to which you would wish to draw my attention?”
“To the curious incident of the dog in the night-time.”
“The dog did nothing in the night-time.”
“That was the curious incident,” remarked Sherlock Holmes.
…
“Before deciding that question I had grasped the significance of the silence of the dog, for one true inference invariably suggests others. The Simpson incident had shown me that a dog was kept in the stables, and yet, though someone had been in and had fetched out a horse, he had not barked enough to arouse the two lads in the loft. Obviously the midnight visitor was someone whom the dog knew well.”
That basis of Holmes argument starts with the hypothesis that when a dog detects an intruder it will bark.
Writing this out as a premise in an argument would look like this:
If (a dog detects an intruder) then (the dog will bark)
This seems like a premise that that has a high degree of probability of being true most of the time. Of course there are unstated assumptions like the dog is healthy and can see, smell, and hear, is not drugged, and can actually bark. Holmes assumes this hypothesis is reliable, having the testimony that dog is used as a guard dog along with the lads to make sure the horse is not stolen.
In a hypothetical form of a philosophical argument the concept of a dog detecting an intruder is called the antecedent. It represents a cause and is often represented by a P.
The concept of the dog barking is called the consequent. It represents an effect and is often represented by a Q.
Using this as a starting point, we can look at the hypothesis and 4 different ways to arrive at a conclusion based on what the second premise in the argument attempts to either confirm or deny.
Note the hypothetical stays the same in all 4 cases, in which we have asserted that P is a cause of the effect Q. We are also assuming that this hypothesis is true. We are only attempting to verify the conclusion that each argument is making. If this hypothesis is false then the conclusion of each argument would also be false (or at least unproven by the argument).
Modus Ponens: Affirming the Antecedent
| hypothetical | If (a dog detects an intruder) then (the dog will bark) |
| premise | The dog detects an intruder |
| conclusion | Therefore the dog barks |
Modus Tollens: Denying the Consequent
| hypothetical | If (a dog detects an intruder) then (the dog will bark) |
| premise | The dog did not bark |
| conclusion | Therefore the dog did not detect an intruder |
Fallacy: Denying the Antecedent
| hypothetical | If (a dog detects an intruder) then (the dog will bark) |
| premise | The dog did not detect an intruder |
| conclusion | Therefore the dog did not bark |
Fallacy: Affirming the Consequent
| hypothetical | If (a dog detects an intruder) then (the dog will bark) |
| premise | The dog barks |
| conclusion | Therefore the dog detects an intruder |
Once we have established these valid and invalid forms of an argument we can apply them to more interesting cases.
Give this one a try:
| hypothetical | If (humans and chimps have a common ancestor) then (humans and chimps have similar genetic makeup) |
| premise | humans and chimps have similar genetic makeup |
| conclusion | Therefore humans and chimps have a common ancestor |
Is this a valid argument?
Today on the National Mall in Washington DC, people will gather together at an event called the Reason Rally. What is the purpose of the gathering? According to the web site it is a “coming out of the closet” for secularists. Here is how the Washington Post is describing it:
Reason Rally will show that all the cool people are atheists now and that the days of consent by silence are over. It’s an appeal to millions of hidden atheists to come out of their closets and join the fun.
One of the speakers, is Richard Dawkins, who poses the question who is against reason?
How have we come to the point where reason needs a rally to defend it? To base your life on reason means to base it on evidence and logic. Evidence is the only way we know to discover what’s true about the real world. Logic is how we deduce the consequences that follow from evidence. Who could be against either?
Sadly, Dawkins concludes that anyone who is not a secularist is against reason, logic, and evidence. He lauds science and reason comparing the building of planes, rockets, Mars rovers, the ability to cure diseases, and the fact that the Earth spins to other things “we know”. Things like the age of the universe, the age of the earth, and the fact that we all evolved from other species.
This is not something new, Dawkins is known for this famous (or is it infamous) quote:
It is absolutely safe to say that if you meet somebody who claims not to believe in evolution, that person is ignorant, stupid or insane (or wicked, but I’d rather not consider that).
He, by his own count says 4x in the article that the “Reason Rally is not for you” if you have not outgrown the supernatural.
Tom Gilson over at Thinking Christian wrote the following:
The new atheists–participants in the contemporary anti-religion movement led by Richard Dawkins, Sam Harris, the late Christopher Hitchens, among others–are working overtime to tell the world that reason favors atheism, and atheism alone.
In this article and in this blog entry, he demonstrates where Dawkins fails to apply the reason he is rallying for.
Unfortunately, the notion that anyone who is religious must be against reason is ridiculous. Questioning the conclusions of science in areas like evolution is not rejecting reason or hiding from evidence. It is however recognizing that some things are probable and can’t be known with absolute certainty.
One of my favorite bloggers and theologians, C. Michael Patton has written on the idea of our need for certainty in a provocative entry “Why I am not completely sure Christianity is true”:
We don’t want probability! People can poke holes in that. We want absolute certainty. We want to be indubitable!” Indubitability ultimately equates to infallible knowledge—knowledge that can’t be wrong.
The science of aerodynamics can be proven with absolute certainty. I happen to live near an airport and see the evidence flying overhead every day. As we look overhead at these engineering marvels it is easy to think that science can prove anything in a similar manner. If scientists can build that plane then they can prove things like evolution too. However, this is committing the fallacy of faulty generalization.
Enns and other theologians have assumed this as a starting point as they grapple with the impacts to theology. But that depends on what we mean by “know” and “prove”. In evaluating Enns claims, I have written about the difference between science that deals with the present, like putting rockets on the moon, and science that deals with the past and events that are a singularity, like the beginning of the universe.
We must all wrestle with the evidences we have available to answer these types of questions regarding what it is true. That even includes our own belief in God as Creator and in Jesus’ death and resurrection. Belief or faith by definition requires trusting something that can’t be proven certain, but does not mean that we are forced to take a “blind leap” that throws reason to the wind.
Christianity is a rational faith based on the historic reality of God interacting with His creation by sending His Son into the world to conquer death and save sinners during the first century. Can we know this with absolute certainty? No. But having examined the evidence I have come to the logical conclusion that it is probable that Christianity is true.
And, if the Reason Rally is a coming out party for atheists to assert how cool they are then,Dawkins is right it is not for me. But then this event is not really a rally for reason, it is just an assembly of atheists.
