When Kirk Cameron recently noted that he favored conditional immortality (CI), also known as annihilationism, over eternal conscious torment (ECT) it created a series or reactions and responses across various platforms. This prompted me to take a deeper look at the fate of those who die without Christ. Among the numerous rebuttals that were offered two major themes emerged that are worth exploring.
- What do we mean by the terms existence, life and death?
- What claims might we make about the soul?
As we delve into these topics we will find that the concept of identity is also important.
Augustine famously quips that he understands “time” until he is asked to explain it.1 That sentiment is just as true when we attempt to define each of the concepts outlined above with any precision. Aristotle starts off his work De Anime (On the Soul) noting that having certainty about the soul is one of the hardest things possible.2 We would be wise to admit that certainty on much of these topics “lies beyond [our] powers” and that there is “darkness in our understanding”. As we pursue these topics my aim, like Augustine, is to do so with a sense of offering the “service of my thinking and my [keyboard]” such that it is “stirring up love for [God] in myself, and in those who read this.” 3
What is existence?
When we say that something exists or has existence, what do we mean. We may start with the idea that some entity is instantiated in reality or actuality. This entity has being as opposed to non-being or nothing. In saying an entity exists we are saying that it is instead of that it is not. The notion of existence is related to the identity of the entity, or the description of what it is (its essential properties). How these things are related to each other is something that has been widely debated by philosophers for millennia.4
When we read “in the beginning God created” we say that He did so ex nihilo. As creation unfolds we find that the Earth starts off as being an entity “without form and empty”. Today, while many may debate its shape, we would affirm that the planet Earth exists. We would also say that there was a moment in which this particular planet did not exist. The Earth is an entity which is capable of being but is also capable of not being. It did not always exist.
Contrast that with the planet Vulcan. Not the one of Star Trek fame, but the planet thought to exist between the Sun and Mercury. For over 50 years this hypothetical planet was thought to exist as an explanation for the “hitch” in Mercury’s orbit. In 1915 Einstein’s general theory of relativity showed that this planet did not exist in actuality despite observable effects thought to have been caused by it. 5 Vulcan was an entity capable of being but is also capable of not being. In our solar system the planet did not ever exist and was nothing more than an idea.
If we can set aside the debates about existence being a first or second order property and other complexities we might offer the following basic definition: To exist is to be actual, not merely conceivable or possible.
The planet Earth exists
The planet Vulcan is conceivable and possible but does not exist and never did
Various ways something can change
Most theories on existence would acknowledge temporal existence in some sense. Let’s consider the planet Alderaan. For the sake of an illustration, let’s assume that it was not a fictional planet. In that galaxy far, far away there would have been a duration of time in which the planet did not exist. After it formed there would be a subsequent duration of time in which the planet did exist and was populated. When the Empire tested the Death Star the planet was destroyed. From that point forward the planet Alderaan would no longer exist. It is no longer actual. However, that would not mean that it did not ever exist, only that it no longer exists.
The planet Alderaan does not exist but did exist in the past
It would be important to note, the destruction of Alderaan did not mean that all of the matter that comprised the planet was no longer in existence. So that raises questions. How should we treat the newly formed meteoroids, formerly part of the planet Alderaan, as they hit the Millennium Falcon? How does identity relate to mere material continuity? How should we understand identity as an entity changes over time?
The essence of
each thing is what it is
said to be propter se. …
What, then, you are
by your very nature
is your essence.6
Aristotle’s approach
The classic example of a bronze statue of a particular Greek god or hero was used by Aristotle to explore these questions. There are varying interpretations of what the Philosopher meant across such works as Categories, Physics and Metaphysics but we can focus on the basics. Looking at the statue we would say that it exists in actuality (it is). According to Aristotle, the substance we identify as the bronze statue of Zeus is a composite entity consisting of matter and form. Matter answers the question what is the entity made of? Form answers the question what is this? The form would also be called the essence or nature. Aristotle’s view is known as the hylomorphic theory, but even if one does not accept it, his theory provides a framework for exploring an entity undergoing substantial change, accidental change and going out of existence. 7
Given that we have a bronze statue of Zeus, one could paint it red. This would be an accidental change. The statue would have the property red but few would argue that the identity of the entity has changed. It is still the same bronze statue of Zeus. The identity would also persist even if the statue were damaged such that it lost a limb or the lightning bolt that was being thrown was removed. This may open up questions about how much change can occur in the matter of a particular entity before we question the identity, a problem famously captured in the Ship of Theseus paradox.8 However, we will set that challenge aside.
By contrast, consider what happens when the bronze statue of Zeus is melted down into a bronze ingot. Much like the planet Alderaan, most would agree that the statue has ceased to exist even thought the matter continues to exist. The statue has undergone substantial change. The entity or substance, which was a composite of matter and form, has had essential properties altered and is no longer identified as the statue of Zeus even though the material it was made of remains.
Leibniz’s Law
Identity is often defined according to Leibniz’s Law:
if x is identical to y, then every property of x is a property of y, and vice versa 9
If we apply that to the statue of Zeus we might consider three temporal states:
- S = the particular bronze statue of Zeus
- At t1: S has both arms and is not painted
- At t2: S is painted red
- At t3: S lost an arm
At first glance, we might argue that the statue has different properties at each moment of time that is under consideration and therefore does not share identity. After all at t1 the statue does not have the property red but does at time t2 and t3. But that is to misapply the law. We must consider the properties as time indexed.
The more accurate way to understand what Leibniz proposed:
- S = the particular bronze statue of Zeus
- S has both arms and is unpainted at t1
- S has both arms and is painted at t2
- S has one arm and is painted at t3
The object S, our statue of Zeus, has the same identity across all of the temporal points because none of the time indexed properties are contradictory. S has the property of being unpainted at t1, painted red at t2, and one-armed at t3 and the identity is preserved across all of these temporal accidental changes.
For clarity, let’s consider a genuine violation of Leibniz’s Law. That would occur when two numerically distinct objects were mistakenly identified as one. Continuing with the example above, we might argue that another bronze statue depicting Apollo exists. Let’s represent that as A. At t2, both S and A are made of bronze, painted red, and have two arms. One may then claim that S is identical to A due to these shared properties. However, despite their similarities, S has the property of being a statue of Zeus, whereas A does not. Under Leibniz’s Law S and A are not identical.
Conclusion
Alternative theories to Aristotle’s hylomorphic theory regarding identity and change have been proposed but most attempt in one way or another to distinguish between changes that preserve an entity’s identity and those that do not, thereby offering an account of how something can undergo change over time while remaining the same entity.
This post has touched on the some of the challenges with defining existence and identity: topics that have been continually debated by philosophers. We have sought to work out some general workable definitions without getting into the multitude of theories or the detailed nuances that exist between them. Nor have we argued for any specific theory. In the next post we will tackle how these relate to a person as a composite of body and soul.
[Continue reading Part 2]
- Augustine, Confessions Book XI Chapter 14
“What then is time? If no one asks me, I know: if I wish to explain it to one that asketh, I know not”
source: https://ccel.org/ccel/augustine/confess.xii.xiv.html ↩︎ - Aristotle, On the Soul Book I, Part 1
https://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/soul.1.i.html ↩︎ - Augustine, Confessions Book XI Chapter 1 ↩︎
- Some good articles on Existence
https://iep.utm.edu/existenc/
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/existence/
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2007/entries/existence/ ↩︎ - Levenson, Thomas, The Hunt for Vulcan, Random House
https://deadheroesdontsave.com/2016/08/08/vulcan-theology-on-seeing-what-we-wish-to-see/ ↩︎ - Aristotle, Metaphysics Book 7, Part 4 ↩︎
- Additional reading on these topics include:
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-metaphysics/
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-causality/ ↩︎ - https://www.britannica.com/topic/ship-of-Theseus-philosophy ↩︎
- https://www.britannica.com/science/identity-of-indiscernibles ↩︎
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