Blogging Thru The Incarnation Four Views: Conciliar Christology Calmly Considered (Part 5)

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This is part of a series of posts exploring each of the views presented in The Incarnation Four Views edited by Andrew Hollingsworth and R.T. Mullins

Having covered each of the models of the Incarnation presented in the Four Views book, I thought I would extend the series by exploring some of the topics that were brought up.

In the first essay Timothy Pawl defined Conciliar Christology as that which was “officially endorsed by the seven ecumenical councils.” 1 He argues that “Conciliar Christology is therefore the traditional, orthodox Christology of the Christian faith” and “is our shared intellectual and theological heritage.” 2

In his critique of Evans’ essay, Pawl asks the question “what counts as orthodoxy.” This was a pointed question raised against Evans’ assertion that his model was orthodox and consistent with the creedal claims about Jesus. 3 Pawl goes on to assert that orthodoxy regarding Christology goes beyond the statements made in the creeds and should include other conciliar documents.4 He argues that one should outline what conciliar documents are being considered, what the councils taught and how one’s model is consistent with them to justify the claim.5

For it is one thing to be persuaded
of the existence of a thing,
and quite another to know what it is.

Gregory of Nazianzus

In his response to Andrew Loke, Pawl critiques the novelty of his model and the reinterpretation of terminology. But Pawl does go on to admit that “all the technical mechanics of the philosophical understanding of the doctrine of the incarnation were novel at some point or other.” 6 The history regarding the “standard terms” shows that they were anything but, undergoing revision over the centuries.

These exchanges in the book brought up an interesting question. What does count as orthodoxy? Even if we appeal to the ancient creeds and councils, does orthodoxy require all of the seven councils or just the earliest ones? Does it require only the creeds or should the canons, letters and other documents be included? Perhaps most interestingly, does orthodoxy require acceptance of the ancient metaphysics or is accounting for the broader claims made about the Trinity and Incarnation enough to count?

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Blogging Thru The Incarnation Four Views: Relative Identity Model (Part 4)

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This is part of a series of posts exploring each of the views presented in The Incarnation Four Views edited by Andrew Hollingsworth and R.T. Mullins. 

View 4: Relative Identity
Joseph Jedwab is an Associate Professor of Philosophy and Government at Kutztown University. He has published several papers, including a review of Timothy Pawl’s In Defense of Conciliar Christology.

Jedwab has the unusual position of writing and defending a model that he does not hold.1 In fact he admits that he doesn’t endorse any model, but does encourage the proposal of many possible models to solve the challenges of the Incarnation.2

Examining the Relative Identity (RI) model he presents is going to be a challenge due to its complexity. Two of the contributors, Loke and Evans, note that they are confused. 3 The other contributor, Pawl, admits that Jedwab’s essay is “daunting”.4 And, I remind you, these are philosophy professors.

One more thing worth noting is that RI, like NSN, sees the Incarnation as a logic problem and relies on formal logic to present the premises in a way that is non-contradictory. Unlike the two kenotic models, RI does not provide a positive explanatory story about how Jesus can be fully divine and human. A point that Jedwab concedes.

The RI model, though, leaves us with a mystery. We cannot fully understand how it could be that different persons are the same being or that different beings are the same person. 5

In his essay Jedwab presents several pages of logical premises and conceptual truths that present apparent contradictions. He also presents several formulas related to RI relations to work through a possible solution.

An example of an apparent contradiction might be (numbering carried over from the essay):

  • P1: The Son is divine and human 6
  • P2: Everything divine is uncreated
  • P3: Everything human is created

The RI model seeks to solve for the contradictory claim that the Son is both uncreated and created.

Before digging into the basics of what RI relations can offer Christology as a solution, I will do my best to explain what the RI model sets out to do more broadly first.

Identity
The philosophical problem of identity is brought to the forefront in this proposed model. The absolute (or standard) model of identity has four major properties.7

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Blogging Thru The Incarnation Four Views: Kenotic Christology (Part 3)

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This is part of a series of posts exploring each of the views presented in The Incarnation Four Views edited by Andrew Hollingsworth and R.T. Mullins. In part one we explored the Narrow Scope Negation model. In part two we explored the Divine Preconscious model.

View 3: Kenotic Christology
C. Stephen Evans is a Professor of Philosophy and Humanities at Baylor University. He was editor, as well as an author, for a collection of essays published in Exploring Kenotic Christology: The Self-Emptying of God.

Like Andrew Loke, Evans notes that his model for the Incarnation may not be “the correct account of how God became human.” 1 Rather his model may be one of several possible models that could be true since it demonstrates that “the doctrine of the incarnation is [not] incoherent.” 2

Evans, like Loke, builds a model of the Incarnation on the idea of kenosis. He also notes, like Loke, that his model is not compatible with a strong view of classical theism. 3 However, he also argues that his model, like Pawl’s, is consistent with the conciliar understanding of Jesus.4

In evaluating Evans’ essay, the other contributors noted a lack of precision in several areas. These include what parts of the conciliar affirmations are required for orthodoxy and which can be set aside and what model of kenosis is adopted.5 To this I would add his essay lacked a clear definition of how he understands “nature” and “person”. 6

What is a nature?
Evans clearly holds that Jesus is fully human and fully divine possessing the essential properties of both. 7 However he rejects that Jesus has two concrete natures. Remember from part 1 that a concrete nature is, itself, a particular entity and is the instantiation of a universal abstract nature. For example, Socrates the human is a concrete nature in whom the abstract universal of “humanness” is real.

For the first two contributors the person Jesus, as incarnate, is a unique entity that possesses two concrete natures, which are themselves entities. Jesus has a concrete divine nature and assumes a concrete human nature, giving Him two natures in which there was no mixture or confusion. 8

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