Blogging Thru The Incarnation Four Views: Narrow Scope Negation (Part 1)

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This summer I have been reading more about the Trinity and Christology. I was excited to see the newly published book that explores four different views on the Incarnation. It was edited by Andrew Hollingsworth and R.T. Mullins. I was unfamiliar with the four main contributors and was interested in seeing the different approaches each would take. This short blog series will cover each view with some of my thoughts.

Having read through the first entry and the responses I have a few observations regarding the book. Understanding that the authors were given a limited amount of space to make their points, they need to be judicious in describing their view. However, that should not have resulted in skipping defining key terms in detail. In addition, readers should know that when they crack the cover they are dropped into the middle of a rather deep philosophical discussion between the contributors. It can take some effort to get oriented. Finally, prior familiarity with the concepts that are part of the Trinitarian and Christological discussion is highly recommended.

View 1: Conciliar Narrow Scope Negation
Dr. Timothy Pawl is the first to present his view. He is a Professor in the Department of Philosophy at the University of St. Thomas and is noted for publishing two books on Conciliar Christology. Pawl argues that a Conciliar Christology is the foundation upon which any model of Christology should be built.

Conciliar Christology considers the first seven ecumenical councils as authoritative. Each of the major claims about Christ affirmed by these councils are considered a core premise which any model of the Incarnation must account for.1 I appreciate Pawl’s respect for the history of the church and acknowledgement of the widespread acceptance of the statements made within the early councils by most Christians.2 However, I would hesitate in affirming his suggestion that these councils were guided into the truth by the Holy Spirit. That may be the case, but to accept that one would have to consider whether that guidance was limited to the main topic that was addressed at each council or whether that extends to all of the canons that were pronounced. Further, even if we did accept some level of guidance and protection by the Spirit, we would need to grapple with the fact that the Trinitarian and Christological statements issued by the councils were largely framed within a Platonic metaphysic that was prevalent at the time. That would open up further discussion on whether the core tenets are to be accepted or if the entire metaphysic must be as well.

It should be noted that even Pawl, in a separate article, acknowledges this.

When the Conciliar Fathers speak of ‘natures’, for instance, what sort of thing do they have in mind? Is Christ’s human nature a flesh and blood composite of body and soul? Or did they mean ‘human nature’ to refer to a universal, shareable thing, perhaps something similar to a platonic form of ‘Humanity’? These two conceptions of what a nature is – called the ‘concrete’ and ‘abstract’ conceptions, respectively, in the contemporary literature – are ontologically vastly different. 3

Defending the authority of the councils is not the goal of his essay nor the book. 4

What might Conciliar Christology look like? The creed adopted at Nicaea, and slightly modified afterwards at the First Council at Constantinople, states:

We believe … in one Lord Jesus Christ, the only begotten Son of God, begotten of his Father before all worlds, Light of Light, very God of very God, begotten not made, being of one substance with the Father, by whom all things were made. Who for us men and for our salvation came down from heaven and was incarnate by the Holy Ghost and the Virgin Mary, and was made man 5

The letter of Pope Agatho as part of the Third Council of Constantinople, states:

we say that as the same our Lord Jesus Christ has two natures so also he has two natural wills and operations, to wit, the divine and the human: the divine will and operation he has in common with the coessential Father from all eternity: the human, he has received from us, taken with our nature in time 6

There are several claims in these two statements but let’s just isolate a few.

  1. Jesus is one substance (nature) with the Father from all eternity
  2. Jesus was incarnate and made man with a human nature in time
  3. Jesus has two natures: divine and human
  4. Jesus has two wills and operations according to each nature

One can readily accept the conciliar affirmation that Jesus is fully God and fully man as a core tenet of Christian faith while being tentative on how we are to understand “nature” and whether the will, intellect and operations adhere to a nature or a person. As we noted above, there are some basic claims but also some particular metaphysical assumptions as well.

Pawl’s model relies on a particular metaphysics. In his essay Pawl does explain that “on the conciliar model, the human nature of Christ is concrete, not abstract … [it is] not a universal, shareable property.” 7 In advocating for a “concrete nature”, Pawl’s is committing to metaphysical moderate realism.

While his Incarnation model is built upon the idea of a “concrete nature” Pawl offered no clear definition of that term in the essay. That is something his interlocutors called out and then rely on Pawl’s other published works to flush that concept out.8

Here are the basics for how Pawl, as I understand it, defines the metaphysic he builds with. The nature is that which answers the question what type a particular entity is. 9 An abstract nature is a universal set of properties which must be instantiated for an entity to be of a particular type. A concrete nature is the instantiation of the abstract nature in an individual entity.10

Putting that all together, Socrates is an individual who instantiates the abstract human nature. Therefore he is a concrete human nature and is categorized as the type “human”. We would also say that Plato and Aristotle instantiate the sharable abstract human nature (universal) and are also individual concrete human natures (particulars).

Socrates would also be categorized as a person (hypostasis) as he is a complete or separate whole.

Here Pawl is using the definition of Aquinas:

Aquinas, following the well-known definition of Boethius, analyzes hypostasis as “a complete substance subsisting of itself and separate from all else.”11

It is this definition that will allow Pawl to argue that the concrete human nature that is assumed by Jesus is not a person in and of itself. It is not because the concrete human nature that is assumed is not a complete whole that is separate from all else. It is a part of Jesus, the entity defined as a person, who also shares in the concrete divine nature.

The Narrow Scope Negation (NSN) model is aimed at dealing with the contradictory premises that result from the Incarnation.12

  • (1) Nothing is both P and not-P
  • (2) Christ is both P and not-P

Here P might stand for any attribute or predicate that can ascribed to the person Jesus. Common examples in the essay dealt with Jesus as both impassible and not impassible (passible).13 Another was that Jesus is both immutable and not immutable (mutable) 14

These statements when predicated of the same entity are clearly contradictory. But the problem, according to Pawl, is that the negation is applied to the whole statement. The contradiction can be avoided by narrowing the scope of the negation to only part of the statement.15 This is possible by ascribing how the person of Christ has some property or has something predicated of Him using the formulation “according to a nature”. 16 Pawl, notes that the NSN model allows any “allegedly contradictory predicates” to be handled in this manner as well. 17

What does that look like?

  • S is P according to N1
  • S is not P according to N2

An example used in Loke’s rebuttal was “knowing the day and hour of His return.” 18 Using the NSN model we would seek to explain how Jesus might both know and not know the day and hour of His return without being a contradiction.

The NSN model would give us

  • Jesus knows when He will return according to His divine nature
  • Jesus does not know when He will return according to His human nature.

This model yields a new set of premises. If I understand it correctly:

  • (1) Nothing with one nature is both P and not-P
  • (2) Christ having two natures can be both P and not-P
  • (3) Christ can be P according to one nature
  • (4) Christ can be not-P according to another nature

In the NSN model an additional premise is also added:

  • (5) Anything attributed to one nature can be predicated to the person (Christ) 19

The clause “according to a nature” is doing some heavy lifting. Among the varied responses to Pawl’s essay, each of the three contributors seemed to have a similar complaint, although framed differently. The model suggests that there are two subjects involved where the subject could be consciousnesses, agents or persons. Andrew Loke argues that this model “draws a distinction between a thing which is self-conscious (the person) and the faculty in virtue of which the person is self-conscious” which could lead to having two “contradictory first-person self-conscious perspectives.” 20 In his rebuttal C. Stephen Evans worries that “each of the two natures seems to be a distinct agent with distinct minds and distinct wills” which undermines the “unity of the person.” 21

Joseph Jedwab, seems to agree with Evans, challenging the way nature and person are understood by Pawl. He asks “why does each nature fail to be a person (hypostasis)” when rationality and operations are ascribed to each. 22

In a review of Pawl’s book, Jedwab makes this point more directly noting that:

one of the first to provide classic definitions of Christological terms is Boethius, who defines ‘person’ as individual substance of a rational nature, and ‘substance’ as what can act or be acted upon. And, on Boethius’ definitions, each concrete nature counts as a substance and person. Each counts as a substance because it acts. … if each nature wills and performs things, it acts. And each counts as a person because it is rational—having an intellect and will. (emphasis added) 23

In that review he will also note that under the NSN model we are still left asking “what conditions does Christ himself satisfy? Is he [as a person] causally affectable by another [passible] or not? He can’t be both.” 24

Jedwab continues to argue that if the divine nature and the human nature were “parts” of the person or features the person has then we might understand why neither nature is itself a person but divine simplicity rules that out. 25

What sees an eye or a person?
An example that Pawl gives to defend premise (5) describes how, using natural language, one might say of a person that they see with their eye but we still would predicate sight to the person. 26 It is also argued that we do not consider the faculty of the eye as a distinct agent. This same thing can be said of Christ and the concrete natures. We predicate things to the person that are done by a faculty.

There are two problems with that example. The first is using the eye as a faculty and considering it analogous to a concrete human nature. An eye is an organ and a mereological part of a person. It is not considered a person or an agent in any context or what ever definition we may adopt. However, the concrete human nature is considered a person or an agent in all cases except in the person of Christ.

But more importantly if we were to flush out this example we would have:

  • Socrates has sight according to his eyes
  • Socrates does not have sight (is blind) according to his feet

These statements are the application of narrow scope negation to Socrates. Of course it is completely reasonable to assert that Socrates sees with his eyes and does not see with his feet. But, no one would say that the person Socrates is blind using natural language. To argue that a person with perfect vision is blind because their feet lack optical nerves would be absurd.

Going back to the NSN model we have:

  • Jesus has knowledge of His return according to His divine nature
  • Jesus does not have knowledge of His return according to His human nature

If we wouldn’t predicate blindness to Socrates when he has sight it is unclear why we should predicate lack of knowledge to the person Jesus when that person knows it. Or asking the same question as Jedwab: does the person Jesus know or not know when He will return?

Mereological parts and simplicity
A third problem, carrying over this example, is that the eye is a mereological part of a human person. The person is comprised of parts and is a complex entity. A mereological part is a sub-component that is part of a larger component. Another example might be noting that a steering wheel is a part of a car. The eye is not a person nor is a steering wheel a car.

Based on the presentation of the NSN model one could readily understand the human and divine natures as “parts” of the person Jesus. But that would make Him a complex entity. The challenge in making that statement is that divine simplicity asserts that God is simple and lacks parts.

Given the strong emphasis on the two distinct concrete natures in the model some of the contributors brought up aspects of classical theism, immutability and simplicity in their responses. Loke notes that the NSN model can be a “good way to respond to many inconsistent predicates with regards to the incarnation. However, I do not think that Pawl’s strategy can be successfully employed with regards to [strong divine immutability].” 27 He, rightly asks how does assuming a concrete human nature not involve change. Jedwab argues that the NSN model would work better if the natures were considered parts so we can readily separate them from the concept of person but that Pawl closed himself off from that option. 28

Pawl deflects from these criticisms by noting that he “didn’t deny that the nature could be a part.” 29 He also notes that he criticizes a strong view of immutability and rejects a “super-duper immutability” that denies any change in any fashion can take place. 30 He emphasizes that “the divine person of the Son can and does change.”31 In his main essay he also writes that “the divine person adds on the human nature as a part or as something analogous to a part.”32

If you had asked me, I would have told you I was surprised at the amount of space across the rebuttals and final response that was dedicated to classical theism. After my reading of the main essay I would understand Pawl as readily affirming the person of Jesus has parts. However, while I was unfamiliar with Pawl’s overall theology, his interlocutors knew better. They pointed out numerous challenges to the NSN model if one also holds to classical theism because Pawl adheres to that view. This was an area where the editors should have worked things out between the authors when their writings were submitted. In addition to defining his main metaphysic in the main essay, it should have been made clearer that Pawl affirms classical theism. 33

In a separate work Pawl acknowledges that “simplicity is a central aspect of Classical Theism.” 34

But Pawl makes it clear that so is the claim that:

Jesus Christ was (and is) the Second Person of the Blessed Trinity. He is true God (and true man). And he both changed and was causally affected. 35

He argues that there are many ways to understand simplicity, while acknowledging that adherents of Classical Theism might find his presentation “unacceptable” and “weak sauce” as he works through the problem. 36

The problem:

The incarnation requires that a divine person have two natures. But, the having of two distinct natures is itself contrary to divine simplicity37

The contributors in this volume, like some adherents of classical theism, were pushing back on Pawl’s model because two distinct natures is “contrary to divine simplicity.”

Pawl relies on the “according to a nature” clause that he describes in this book in this work as well. He argues that Jesus is both simple and complex. 38

  • Jesus is simple according to his divine nature
  • Jesus is complex (not simple) according to his human nature

Describing the person Jesus as having two distinct concrete natures would allow one to readily conclude these are mereological parts that would then make Him a composite whole. The question can be asked: is the person Jesus simple or complex? Whether the NSN model can adequately put forward a composite person and still credibly claim simplicity is a debate for another post.

As I conclude, I should note that while Pawl is committed to Conciliar Christology, he acknowledges that the Narrow Scope Negation model he argues for as a solution is not required by the councils. 39

  1. Pawl, Timothy, Conciliar Christology, University of St. Andrews (source: https://www.saet.ac.uk/Christianity/ConciliarChristology) ↩︎
  2. I would hold views similar to John Wesley who wrote in his “Address to the Clergy” that one should pursue “the knowledge of the Fathers the most authentic commentators on Scripture, as being both nearest the fountain, and eminently endued with that Spirit by whom all Scripture was given. It will be easily perceived, I speak chiefly of those who wrote before the Council of Nice.”  ↩︎
  3. Pawl, Timothy, Conciliar Christology ↩︎
  4. It was not clear whether Pawl, himself, held the view that the councils were “the work of the Spirit”. In his response to the replies made regarding his essay he notes that “this book is not the place to enter into disputes about whether the councils should be viewed as authoritative.” (p 98) ↩︎
  5. Schaff, Philip, The Seven Ecumenical Councils of the Undivided Church, (source: https://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/npnf214.ix.iii.html) ↩︎
  6. Schaff, Philip, The Seven Ecumenical Councils of the Undivided Church, (source: https://ccel.org/ccel/schaff/npnf214/npnf214.xiii.v.html) ↩︎
  7. Hollingsworth, Mullins, The Incarnation Four Views (p 43) Wipf and Stock Publishers ↩︎
  8. Ibid 82 ↩︎
  9. Ibid 83, 95
    Jedwab quotes Pawl (quoting Dalmau) describing the “essence or nature of the thing .. that places the things in a certain order of beings and radically separates it from other orders of things.”

    Pawl in his response to the interlocutors adds that “a nature is one of those metaphysical constituents – one that determines what type of substance it is.” ↩︎
  10. Jedwab Joseph, Timothy Pawl. In Defense of Conciliar Christology.
    Oxford, Oxford University Press: 2016 in Journal of Analytic Theology, Vol. 6, August 2018
    (source: https://philpapers.org/archive/JEDTPI.pdf) (p 743-744) ↩︎
  11. Incarnation Four Views 34 ↩︎
  12. Ibid 44 ↩︎
  13. Ibid 44 ↩︎
  14. Ibid 51 ↩︎
  15. Ibid 50 ↩︎
  16. Ibid 47 ↩︎
  17. Ibid 51 ↩︎
  18. Ibid 66 ↩︎
  19. Ibid 41-42 ↩︎
  20. Ibid 66-67 ↩︎
  21. Ibid 74,76 ↩︎
  22. Ibid 80 ↩︎
  23. Jedwab Joseph, Timothy Pawl. In Defense of Conciliar Christology.
    Oxford, Oxford University Press: 2016 in Journal of Analytic Theology, Vol. 6, August 2018
    (source: https://philpapers.org/archive/JEDTPI.pdf) (p 745) ↩︎
  24. Ibid 747 ↩︎
  25. Incarnation Four Views (p 80-81) ↩︎
  26. Ibid 92 ↩︎
  27. Ibid 64 ↩︎
  28. Ibid 81 ↩︎
  29. Ibid 94 ↩︎
  30. Ibid 99 ↩︎
  31. Ibid 99 (emphasis in original) ↩︎
  32. Ibid 43 ↩︎
  33. Ibid 98

    Pawl’s notes: ‘Loke moves on to characterize my view of immutability, then criticize it. But I think he misfires. He claims that my view of divine immutability “affirms that God cannot undergo real or intrinsic change in any respect.” I was surprised by this characterization of my view, as I’ve been at pains to say that the divine person of the Son can and does change. … I don’t accept [a strong version of divine immutability].’ ↩︎
  34. Pawl, Timothy, The Incarnation of a Simple God, an essay in the book Classical Theism: New Essays on the Metaphysics of God (Routledge Studies in the Philosophy of Religion) (p 306) ↩︎
  35. Ibid 304 ↩︎
  36. Ibid 310 ↩︎
  37. Ibid 311 ↩︎
  38. Ibid 308 ↩︎
  39. Incarnation Four Views (p 31) ↩︎

What do you think?